Today, Planet PostgreSQL was switched over from http to https. Previously, https was only used for the logged in portions for blog owners, but now the whole site uses it. If you access the page with the http protocol, you will automatically be redirected to https.
As part of this, the RSS feeds have also changed address from http to https (the path part of the URLs remain unchanged). If your feed reader does not automatically follow redirects, this will unfortunately make it stop updating until you have changed the URL.
In a couple of days we will enable HTTP Strict Transport Security on the site as well.
We apologize for the inconvenience for those of you who have to reconfigure your feeds, but we hope you agree the change is for the better.
We've just flipped the switch on www.postgresql.org to be served on https only. This has been done for a number of reasons:
We have not yet enabled HTTP Strict Transport Security, but will do so in a couple of days once we have verified all functionality. We have also not enabled HTTP/2 yet, this will probably come at a future date.
Please help us out with testing this, and let us know if you find something that's not working, by emailing the pgsql-www mailinglist.
There are still some other postgresql.org websites that are not available over https, and we will be working on those as well over the coming weeks or months.
The POODLE attack on https (the attack is about https, the vulnerability in SSL, an important distinction) has received a lot of media attention lately, so I figured a (very) short writeup was necessary.
The TL;DR; version is, you don't have to worry about POODLE for your PostgreSQL connections when using SSL.
The slightly longer version can be summarized by:
PostgreSQL can, as many other products, use SSL to secure client/server communications. It can be configured to be optional or required, to require a client certificate, or even to use the SSL client certificate to log in. However, the DBA tools are currently a bit lacking in this regard. In particular, there is no way for a DBA to see what SSL parameters are in force (or indeed if SSL is enabled at all) for an already existing connection.
There are multiple ways to see the status of a specific connection (such as the libpq PQgetssl() function, the psql startup message or the sslinfo module. Unfortunately all these methods have one thing in common - they are only available to the process making the connection to the database, not to a DBA inspecting the system from the outside.
9.4 will make it a little bit better, because log_connections now include SSL information when the user connects, similar to:
LOG: connection authorized: user=mha database=postgres SSL enabled (protocol=TLSv1.1, cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA)
But this can still be a bit of a pain to figure out for existing connectioons of course.
To deal with this problem, I've written a small PostgreSQL extension called pg_sslstatus. When loaded using shared_preload_libraries it will keep track of the SSL status for each connection, and expose it through a system view named pg_sslstatus like this:
postgres=# SELECT * FROM pg_sslstatus; pid | ssl | bits | compression | version | cipher | clientdn -------+-----+------+-------------+---------+----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------- 27286 | t | 256 | f | TLSv1 | ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA | 26682 | t | 256 | t | TLSv1 | ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA | /C=AU/ST=Some-State/O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd/CN=magnus 26693 | f | | | | | (3 rows)
It will include one row for each connection, and can then be joined with either pg_stat_activity or pg_stat_replication to view the SSL data in a bigger context:
postgres=# SELECT datname, usename, client_addr, ssl, cipher FROM pg_stat_activity INNER JOIN pg_sslstatus ON pg_stat_activity.pid=pg_sslstatus.pid; datname | usename | client_addr | ssl | cipher ----------+---------+-------------+-----+---------------------- postgres | mha | 127.0.0.1 | t | ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA postgres | mha | | f | pgweb | pgweb | | f | (2 rows)
The extension is available from my github account today for existing version of PostgreSQL, under the standard PostgreSQL license. My plan is to work on having a similar view included in PostgreSQL 9.5 by default, but it's unfortunately too late to include it in 9.4 at this point.
Is your PostgreSQL installation vulnerable to the Heartbleed bug in OpenSSL? The TL;DR; version is "maybe, it depends, you should read this whole thing to find out". If you are vulnerable, it is a high risk vulnerability!
The slightly longer version is that it will be vulnerable if you are using SSL, and not vulnerable if you are not. But the situation is not quite that easy, as you may be using SSL even without planning to. PostgreSQL also not provide any extra protection against the bug - if you are using SSL, you are vulnerable to the bug just as with any other service.
As the bug is in OpenSSL, however, what you need to get patched is your OpenSSL installation and not PostgreSQL itself. And of course, remember to restart your services (this includes both PostgreSQL and any other services using SSL on your system). You will then have to consider in your scenario if you have to replace your SSL keys or not - the same rules apply as to any other service.
PostgreSQL by default ships with SSL turned off on most platforms. The most notable exception is Debian and derivatives (such as Ubuntu), which enable SSL by default.
If SSL is disabled globally, your installation is not vulnerable.
The easiest way to check this is to just use a simple SQL query:
postgres=# show ssl; ssl ----- off (1 row)
If this parameter returns off, you are not vulnerable. If it returns on, you are.
If you do not need SSL, the easiest fix is to turn this off and restart PostgreSQL. This also brings additional benefits of not paying the overhead of encryption if you don't need it. If you actually use SSL, this is of course not an option.
If you have installed PostgreSQL using a package based system, such as yum (from redhat/fedora or from yum.postgresql.org), apt (from debian/ubuntu/etc or from apt.postgresql.org), FreeBSD ports etc, it is up to your operating system to provide a patch. Most major distributions have already done this - you just need to to install it (and restart your services!). If your distribution has not yet updated, you need to convince them to do so ASAP.
If you are using a PostgreSQL installation package that bundles OpenSSL, you need an updated version of this package. The most common example of this is the EnterpriseDB Graphical Installers primarily used on Windows and Mac. We expect a new version of these installers to be released within a day or a few.
Postgres.app is also vulnerable and needs an update, but is normally not used for servers.
The OpenSCG separate download packages are also vulnerable.
For each of these you will have to wait for an updated package to show up in the next couple of days. All package maintainers have been notified, so it's only a matter of time.
Per the www.postgresql.org download pages we do recommend that you always use the "package manager" system for any platform where this is supported, which means most modern Linux or BSD distributions. If you are currently using one of the above installers on these platforms, a quick fix before the packages are out would be to switch to one of the "package manager" platforms that rely on the operating system update process. This may or may not be an option of course, depending on the complexity of the installation.
If you are using a platform where this is not available (such as Windows), your only option is to wait.
In PostgreSQL, the SSL negotiation happens before pg_hba.conf is matched. And the vulnerability in OpenSSL is in the negotiation phase. For this reason, even if you have restricted access to your server using pg_hba.conf IP filter rules, or your pg_hba.conf specifies only hostnossl records, this does not protect you.
Obviously, if you have an IP level firewall, either at the host or on the network, that will protect you. But pg_hba does not.
The pgcrypto module in PostgreSQL uses OpenSSL to provide encryption functions when available. Since the vulnerability is specifically in the protocol negotiation, use in pgcrypto is not vulnerable to this issue.
(public service announcement further down!)
I'm starting to get ready for the most mis-named conference so far this year. I mean, seriously. It's called East 2010, and yet it's located approximately 6000 km (that's almost 4000 miles for you Americans) to the west of the prime meridian. That's not even close. Sure, it's to the east of where the West conference is usually held, but really, this reminds me of POSIX timezones...
This will be a somewhat different conference than previous PostgreSQL conferences. It's the first big commercial conference. This has enabled it to change venue from "local university or college where rooms are cheap or free" to a conference hotel in downtown Philadelphia. Whether this is actually good for the talks is yet to be seen, but it's likely going to make some things around the conference easier and more integrated. There will also be a exhibition area - something we have tried for pgday.eu without much interest, but it will hopefully be more successful in this surrounding.
The contents of the conference are also somewhat different, since there is now a clear focus also on "decision makers", something that many PostgreSQL conferences have been lacking in. We may all want it to be true that the decision makers are the people who are actually going to use the product, but we know that's not true. This gives a conference schedule that contains a broader range of talks than we're used to - this can only be good.
Myself, I will be giving an updated version of my security talk, focusing on authentication and SSL. The updates are mainly around the new and changed authentication methods in 9.0, and some minor updates on the SSL part. If you've seen it before it may be an interesting refresher, but you might be better off going to see Greg Smith's benchmarking talk if you haven't...
Now for the second part, which is the public service announcement...
If you're like me, you find the official schedule for East very hard to read and basically useless to get an overview. It's also horrible to use from a device like the iPhone, something I'm quite likely to use at the conference. But we solved this problem for the PostgreSQL Europe conferences, and that code is pretty simple. So some copy/paste of a couple of hundred lines of python, some glue code, and voilà, a much more (IMHO) readable schedule. As a bonus, it also generates an aggregate iCalendar feed, that you can plug directly into the calendar application on the iPhone (or I assume most other phones). Google calendar may be very nice to use to work on the schedule, but I find this a lot more user friendly for those reading it - particularly in the ability to get an overview.
The page and the feed will both update once per hour by pulling from the official calendar feeds. They will also adjust for the fact that all the official feeds are 3 hours off due to the calendars being set in the wrong timezone. So should they suddenly jump 3 hours that's because the official ones were fixed - just remind me and I'll take out the adjustment. Anybody is free to use them, but of course, usual disclaimers apply, double check with the official one, etc, etc, etc.
Finally, then mandatory before
and after shots.
If you're interested in the code for the aggregator itself, it's up on my github page. And of course, any patches for cool features or just making it look better are always appreciated - it's open source after all.
We're now up to the third day of pgcon, the first one of the actual conference - the previous ones being dedicated to tutorials. The day started with Selena, me and Dave doing a semi-improvised keynote. Well, it started with Dan saying welcome and going through some details, but he doesn't count... I doubt we actually spread any knowledge with that talk, but at least we got to plug some interesting talks at the conference, and show pictures of elephants.
Missed the start of the Aster talk on Petabyte databases using standard PostgreSQL, but the parts I caught sounded very interesting. I'm especially excited to hear they are planning to contribute a whole set of very interesting features back to core PostgreSQL. This makes a lot of sense since they're building their scaling on standard PostgreSQL and not a heavily modified one like some other players in the area, and it's very nice to see that they are realizing this.
After this talk, it was time for my own talk on PostgreSQL Encryption. I had a hard time deciding the split between pgcrypto and SSL when I made the talk, but I think it came out fairly well. Had a number of very good questions at the end, so clearly some people were interested. Perhaps even Bruce managed to learn something...
After this we had lunch, and I'm now sitting in Greg Smiths talk about benchmarking hardware. This is some very low level stuff compared to what you usually see around database benchmarking, but since this is what sits underneath the database, it's important stuff. And very interesting.
The rest of the day has a lineup of some very nice talks, I think. So there'll be no sitting around in the hallway! And in the evening there is the EnterpriseDB party, of course!
Yesterday had the developer meeting, where a bunch (~20) of the most active developers that are here in Ottawa sat down together for the whole day to discuss topics around the next version of PostgreSQL, and how our development model works. Got some very important discussions started, and actually managed to get agreement on a couple of issues that have previously been going in circles. All in all, a very useful day.